Currently fiscal policies in Germany seem to be in a very comfortable position and the German Debt Brake is regarded as an institutional precondition for this success and has been exported to the Euro area in the guise of the Fiscal Compact. In this paper we scrutinize German fiscal policies and its new national and European institutional constraints from a macroeconomic perspective. We start by reiterating the requirements for fiscal policies of member countries in a currency union like the Euro area from a Post-Keynesian perspective and examine German fiscal policies in the period from 1999 until 2007 against this theoretical background. We then turn to German fiscal policies during the Great Recession, the German Debt Brake, the Fiscal Compact and future perspectives, and analyse the associated problems and risks. Finally, we discuss alternative scenarios which could avoid the deflationary pressures of the German Debt Brake and the Fiscal Compact on domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area.
Introduction
From a mainstream macroeconomic point of view German fiscal policy seemed to be in a very comfortable position in the years after the Great Recession. After the stimulus packages to counter the recession in 2009 and 2010 the fiscal exit was quick and apparently smooth: the 2010 budget deficit of 4.1 per cent of GDP had been turned into a small surplus of 0.1 per cent of GDP within only two years by 2012. At the same time the German economy had recovered very strongly from the crisis with comparatively low and even decreasing unemployment. The perceived reason behind the German success story seemed to be the fact that Germany had already incorporated a debt brake into its Constitution back in the summer of 2009, just before the onset of the Euro crisis. According to the brake, from 2020 onwards the structural government deficit must not be higher than 0.35 per cent of GDP.
It might, therefore, seem logical to regard the German Debt Brake as a tried and tested instrument of a successful and solid fiscal policy and declare it a shining example and role model for the future of all European countries. The inclusion into the German Constitution of stringent limits on sovereign debt, it is argued, enhances the country's credibility on the financial markets, leading to lower risk premiums and, hence, easier public sector financing (see Heinemann et al. 2011 ). This logic suggests that exporting the German Debt Brake or similar fiscal rules to the Euro-area countries currently in crisis would be a major contribution to solving the euro crisis -a view quite prominent in the German discussion (see e.g. Heinemann et al. 2011) . When most EU governments pledged at the end of 2011 to introduce stricter limits on public debts and deficits, where possible incorporating them into the Constitution, this resulted primarily from an acute sense of panic in the face of the continuing escalation of the euro crisis. For the first time, even the bonds of hitherto unaffected countries had come under pressure in the financial markets. But the fact that European governments resorted to the German approach of constitutionally fixed debt brakes certainly also has something to do with the allegedly easily demonstrable success of the German example.
However, in our view, this interpretation is flawed for several reasons. On the one hand, even without questioning the general macroeconomic logic of the debt brake it seems far too early to consider Germany a successful case: the debt brake has only been in place for a few years and under quite favourable macroeconomic circumstances. On the other hand, and more importantly, from a sound macroeconomic perspective the whole concept of the debt brake lacks a convincing justification. Firstly, restricting fiscal deficits and government debts ignores basic macroeconomic accounting identities and implicitly demands corresponding reactions of the other macroeconomic sectors, the private sector and the external sector, if depressing short-and long-run effects on aggregate demand, output and employment are to be avoided. Secondly, imposing strict 'one size fits all' restrictions of government deficits and debts on the member countries of a currency union, which is as heterogeneous as the Euro area deprives member countries of the most important tool left to counter asymmetric shocks in the short run and to balance current accounts within the currency union in the long run.
Therefore, and thirdly, the introduction of debt brakes à la Germany carries severe risks for future macroeconomic developments, in Germany and in the Euro area. Under realistic parameter constellations, it imposes severe deflationary pressure on domestic demand in Germany, and in the other countries which (have to) follow this role model, and it is difficult to see how this will be compensated for by increasing external demand from the rest of the world. It prevents the internal rebalancing of current account imbalances within the Euro area, and finally, it prevents adequate fiscal responses in Euro area member states -and thus also Germany -in the face of the current and of future cyclical downturns or periods of prolonged stagnation.
In this paper we will scrutinize fiscal policies in Germany from a macroeconomic perspective. In Section 2 we will reiterate the requirements for fiscal policies of member countries in a currency union like the Euro area from a Post-Keynesian perspective. Section 3 will then examine German fiscal policies in the period from 1999 until 2007, that is from the introduction of the euro until the Great Recession, and we will show that fiscal policies contributed considerably to the German 'export-led mercantilist' type of economic development, which is one of the causes of the deep euro crisis. In Section 4 we will then turn to German fiscal policies during the crisis, the German Debt Brake in association with the European Fiscal Compact and the debt reduction rule of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and future perspectives. This section will briefly cover the unexpected counter-cyclical fiscal reactions towards the crisis and will then analyse the German Debt Brake as well as the Fiscal Compact and the associated risks in more detail. Section 5 will then turn to alternative scenarios which could avoid the deflationary pressures of the new national and European institutional constraints for government deficits on domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area. Section 6 will conclude.
Requirements for fiscal policies in a currency union -a Post-Keynesian perspective
Fiscal policy has a major role to play in a Post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy assignment in general and has to be carefully coordinated with the other areas of macroeconomic policy making, i.e. monetary policy and wage policy (Hein and Stockhammer, 2010; Arestis, 2013) . This is particularly true in a currency union such as the Euro area, where monetary policies are centralised and the base interest rate, the main tool of the central bank, cannot be geared towards the requirements of individual countries or regions, where wage policies are difficult to coordinate across the currency area, and where fiscal policies are still the responsibility of the national governments of the member countries. In this section we will outline a benchmark for fiscal policies under these circumstances and in the context of the coordination of the macroeconomic policy mix as a whole. We will first outline an optimal policy mix aimed at maintaining high non-inflationary employment and roughly balanced current accounts of the member countries within the currency area. Then we will briefly address necessary variations and deviations, which are required in a situation of huge current account imbalances, as those that have piled up prior to the euro crisis and which have to be at least partially rebalanced. 1 Regarding monetary policies, in contrast to the New Consensus Macroeconomics, 2 the Post-Keynesian approach (Hein and Stockhammer, 2010) advocated here recommends that the central bank's interest rate policies should abstain from attempting to fine tune unemployment in the short run and inflation in the long run. This has several reasons. In the short run, the effectiveness of interest rate policies in achieving macroeconomic targets in terms of employment and inflation is asymmetric. Raising the base interest rate in a constellation of accelerating inflation will finally also make credit and financial market rates increase and will therefore be able to choke off any investment boom. But if accelerating disinflation and finally deflation prevail in a downturn and in a depression, monetary interest rate policies will be ineffective due to the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate, due to rising mark ups in the setting of interest rates in credit and financial markets by banks and financial intermediaries, because of increasing risk and uncertainty premiums, and due to interest rate inelasticities of real investment of firms in a disinflationary or deflationary climate. Furthermore, taking long-run cost and distribution effects into account, rising interest rates, applied successfully in order to stop accelerating inflation in the short run, will feed conflicting claims inflation again in the long run, because price setting of surviving firms will have to cover higher interest costs. Therefore, central banks should generally focus on targeting low real interest rates in credit and financial markets in order to avoid unfavourable cost and distribution effects on firms and workers. 3 A slightly positive long-term real rate of interest, below the long-run rate of productivity growth or the long-run growth rate of real GDP, seems to be a reasonable target. Rentiers' real financial wealth will be protected against inflation, but redistribution of income in favour of the productive sectors and at the expense of the rentiers will take place, which should be favourable for real investment, employment and 1 See Hein (2012, Chapter 8) and for an analysis of the euro crisis and the role of the internal current account imbalances. 2 For the NCM see Goodfriend and King (1997) , Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) , and for detailed critiques of the NCM and its application in economic policy making in the EU, see Arestis (2009 Arestis ( , 2011a Arestis ( , 2011b growth. Furthermore, the central bank has to act as a 'lender of last resort' in periods of liquidity crisis, not only for the private and public banking sector, but also for the governments. As the recent euro crisis has shown, this is extremely important for the member countries of a currency union. If the central bank unconditionally guarantees the public debt of the member countries of a currency area, these countries can go into debt in their 'own currency' and can avoid excessive risk premiums imposed by rentiers in financial markets.
Different institutional solutions for this are possible and have been suggested for the ECB and the Euro area. In Hein (2013) it was suggested that the ECB could simply announce that it will intervene into secondary government bond markets as soon as the rate of nominal interest on government bonds exceeds the long-run nominal rate of growth of the respective country.
These open market operations would give the central bank of the currency area the opportunity to target different interest rates, in particular if long-run growth trends of member countries of the currency union persistently deviate. Palley's (2011) proposal of a European
Public Finance Authority issuing joint debt of Euro area member countries, which the ECB is then allowed to trade, may be an alternative to this suggestion. Here is not the place and space to go into any deeper discussion. What is important for the purpose of the present paper, focussing on fiscal policies in a currency union, is that the central bank of the currency union guarantees the public debt of the member countries without limitations and thus allows member countries to fulfil the fiscal policy tasks which we will specify below.
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Incomes and wage policies should take care of nominal stabilisation, i.e. stable inflation at some policy determined target rate. Since accelerating inflation is always the result of unresolved distribution conflicts, distributional claims of workers, firms, rentiers, government, and the external sector have to be consistent with each other. Therefore, if the claims of the other actors are constant, as a guideline nominal wages in each country should rise according to the sum of long-run growth of labour productivity in the relevant country plus the inflation target for the currency union as a whole. On the one hand, this would keep distributional shares in each country constant, and on the other hand, this would mean that each country would obtain the target rate of inflation in the medium to long run. Following such a policy would, therefore, prevent 'beggar-thy-neighbour' strategies. In order to achieve the targets for nominal wage growth, a high degree of wage bargaining co-ordination at the macroeconomic level, and organised labour markets with strong trade unions and employer associations seem to be a necessary condition. 5 Government involvement in wage bargaining may be required, too. In particular, minimum wage legislation and a minimum wage following the wage norm pointed out above, especially in countries with highly deregulated labour markets and increasing wage dispersion, will be helpful for nominal stabilisation at the macroeconomic level, apart from its usefulness in terms of containing wage inequality.
Deregulation of the labour market, weakening labour unions, and reductions in the reservation wage rate by means of cutting unemployment benefits, however, will be detrimental to nominal stabilisation and will rather impose deflationary pressures on the economy.
With the assignment of monetary and wage policies as in the previous paragraphs, fiscal policies will have to take the responsibility for real stabilisation, full employment and also a more equal distribution of disposable income. This has the following implications. By definition the excess of private saving (S) over private investment (I) at a given level of economic activity and employment has to be absorbed by the excess of exports (X) over imports (M) (including the balance of primary income and the balance of income transfers, thus the current account balance) plus the excess of government spending (G) over tax revenues (T):
Therefore, with balanced current accounts within the currency area, government deficits (D = G -T) have to permanently take up the excess of private saving over private investment in order to assure a high desired level of employment:
This is, of course, the 'functional finance' view, pioneered by Lerner (1943) . 6 As is well known from Domar (1944), a constant government deficit-GDP ratio (D/Y) with a constant long-run GDP growth rate (g) will make the government debt-GDP ratio (B/Y) converge towards a definite value. A constant government debt-GDP ratio (B/Y) requires that government debt and GDP grow at the same rate:
Since the government deficit is D = G -T = !B, it follows that:
and hence:
Therefore, there will be no problem of accelerating public debt-GDP ratios if governments follow the functional finance view. In a situation of massive current account imbalances, as they have developed in the Euro area from 1999 until 2008/9, some deviations from the norms for fiscal and wage policies outlined above are required in order to contribute to internally rebalancing the currency union. Current account surplus countries should use more expansionary fiscal policies to increase domestic demand such that current account surpluses are reduced and even temporary current account deficits might arise -and the actual growth rate adjusts towards and even exceeds the balance of payments constrained growth rate temporarily. This would lift external growth for the current account deficit countries and would thus allow these countries to reduce their deficits. For a transitional period, the current account surplus countries should also increase their rates of inflation relative to the rates of inflation in the current account deficit countries. Nominal wage growth in the surplus countries should therefore exceed the sum of national productivity growth plus the Euro area inflation target during the adjustment process.
The major task for the current account deficit countries is to improve their balance of payments constrained growth rates. This means, on the one hand, to contribute to a reduction of the inflation differentials with respect to the surplus countries, by means of nominal wage growth below the sum of national productivity growth plus the inflation target. The inflation target for the currency area as a whole should allow for room of manoeuvre and prevent the risk of deflation in these countries during the process of adjustment. Fiscal policies in a transition period should undercut the norm we have outlined above. However, more importantly these countries have to increase the income elasticity of demand for their exports and to reduce the income elasticity of demand for imports by means of industrial, structural and regional policies; this means they have to improve their non-price competitiveness.
German fiscal policies in the macroeconomic context of 1999-2007
Elsewhere we have classified the German type of development, in particular from the introduction of the euro in 1999 until the financial and economic crises starting in 2007/08
and culminating in the euro crisis since 2010, as 'export-led mercantilist' (Hein 2012, Chapters 6 and 8; . In this type of development rising export and current account surpluses stabilise aggregate demand and take care of the realisation of rising profits against the background of redistribution at the expense of (low) labour incomes and stagnating real investment. 7 This is for each significant feature of finance-dominated capitalism, which has been prevailing in the major countries of the developed capitalist world since the 1980s/1990s. 8 Apart from Germany, this type of development dominated in Euro area countries like Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, and also in countries like China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia at the global level (Hein and Mundt 2012) . The necessary counterpart to this type is the 'debt-led consumption boom' type, where increases in notional wealth triggered by stock market or housing market booms, together with liberalised financial markets, new financial instruments and weakened conditions of creditworthiness, were conducive to soaring private consumption, flourishing aggregate demand, the realisation of rising profits, but also to high and rising current account deficits. This regime could be found in Euro area countries, like Greece, Ireland and Spain, and also in the UK, the US, Australia and Mexico at the global scale (Hein and Mundt 2012) . In between these two types we have the 'domestic demand-led' type, which neither relies on export surpluses, which distinguishes it from the first type, nor on flourishing debt-financed consumption, which distinguishes it from the second type. The 'domestic demand-led' type has been found in Euro area countries like France, Italy and Portugal, but also in India, Turkey and South Africa (Hein and Mundt 2012) . Interestingly, the Euro area as a whole, that is the initial EA-12, has shown domestic demand-led features before the beginning of the recent crises ).
The major characteristics of the German 'export-led mercantilist' regime can be outlined with the help of the data provided in Table 1 , which contains the average key macroeconomic variables for the period from the introduction of the euro in 1999 until 2007, the year before the start of the financial and economic crises. The German data are compared to the EA-12, i.e. the initial Euro area (including Greece) before its later enlargements, which of course includes Germany as the largest economy. As should be clear from what has been outlined in the previous paragraph, the EA-12 is composed of quite heterogeneous countries, contains all the three types of development outlined above, and has thus been suffering from major internal imbalances, which have been at the roots of the euro crisis.
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As can be seen in Table 1 , German GDP growth in the period before the crises was well below EA-12 average. With weak domestic demand, more than 50 per cent of German growth was contributed by net exports, whereas EA-12 growth was almost exclusively driven by domestic demand. This was reflected by a considerably higher share of net exports in nominal GDP in Germany as compared to the EA-12 as a whole, where this share was rather modest.
The German sectoral financial balances display high surpluses of the private sector, that is high excesses of private saving over private investment, which to much less than 50 per cent were mopped up internally by public sector deficits and therefore required high external sector deficits to be maintained, i.e. high German current account surpluses (see also Figure   1 ). The less pronounced private sector surpluses of the EA-12 as a whole were mainly used internally by public sector deficits and only small external sector deficits and thus current account surpluses of the EA-12 arose (see also Figure 2 ). These findings imply that the major counterparts to the German current account surpluses were to be found within the Euro area.
In Germany, the private sector surplus was generated by the private household sector -on The 'export-led mercantilist' development and high and persistent German current account surpluses were based on two factors. Firstly, the price competitiveness of German producers in international markets improved significantly (Table 1) . This is true with respect to Euro area competitors but also to the competitors outside the Euro area. Although the nominal effective exchange rate increased in Germany, albeit to a lesser degree than for the EA-12, the real effective exchange rate fell remarkably in the period under consideration. The major reason for this was nominal wage moderation with even slightly falling nominal unit labour costs on average over the period 1999-2007, as compared to moderately rising values for the EA-12 as a whole, which also undercut the norm outlined in the previous section of this paper. The violation of the norm for wage policies within a currency union by Germany caused below EA-12 average price inflation and therefore considerable improvements in price competitiveness of German producers with respect to their Euro area competitors, in particular. Secondly, the German 'export-led mercantilist' model was based on weak domestic demand and thus low growth contributions from domestic sources. There are several reasons for this. Re-distribution at the expense of the labour income share was even more accentuated than in the EA-12 as a whole, which caused weak consumption demand, because the propensities to consume out of labour income are way above the respective propensities from profit income. 10 Furthermore, since inflation was lower than in the EA-12, German real interest rates were above EA-12 average. And even more importantly, since German real GDP growth fell short of EA-12 average, the differentials between real interest rates and real GDP growth were less favourable here. In particular, the difference between the long-term real interest rate and the real GDP growth rate remained significantly positive on average over the period 1999-2007 in Germany, whereas for the EA-12 as a whole it was close to zero, and therefore close to the norm for monetary policies outlined in Section 2. Single monetary policies by the ECB thus had restrictive long-run effects in Germany, whereas they were almost neutral for the EA-12 as a whole. Finally, also fiscal policies contributed significantly to weak domestic demand and thus to the German 'export-led mercantilist' model. This has two aspects.
Taking a long-run perspective, fiscal deficits fell short of the norm for the members of a currency union outlined in the previous section. In Germany, fiscal deficits only absorbed less than half of the excess of private saving over private investment, whereas in the EA-12 as a whole the absorption rate was more than 80 per cent. The German constellation would have required fiscal deficits of around 5 per cent of GDP, which was of course prevented by the regulations of the European Treaties and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), mainly initiated by Germany itself. But also in a short-run perspective, German fiscal policies were overly restrictive. We assess the extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising influence on the business cycle by comparing changes in the output gap and the cyclically adjusted budget-balance ratio to potential GDP (CBR), using the relevant estimates , and also to a much lesser degree than in the German case. In addition, the German pro-cyclical consolidation strategy was very much focussed on the expenditure side: Very significant tax cuts, many of them favouring wealthy households and corporations were overcompensated by increases in social security contributions and -above all -by strong cuts on the expenditure side (see Jacoby and Truger 2002; and Truger et al. 2010, pp. 28-48) . However, it has to be noted that these are aggregate values, which potentially hide inappropriate fiscal policies in the individual member countries, i.e. overly restrictive policies in the current account surplus countries, as in Germany, and overly expansive policies in the current account deficit countries. Net lending, Government, cyclically adjusted, % of Potential GDP UBLGAP Output gap (Potential GDP) AVGDGP Structural Government Balance, % of GDP (excessive deficit procedure) UBLGAPS standard NAIRU models: There is a long-run equilibrium, determined by structural characteristics of the labour market, which is independent of the short-run fluctuations generated by demand shocks or macroeconomic policy. We do not share this view. Empirically, these measures are very sensitive to the exact method used and to the choice of observation period. The separation of a cyclical from a potential or trend component can be biased because the potential component is endogenous. After years with unexpectedly high (low) growth caused by 'short-term' demand side measures or 'shocks', the potential or trend growth will be adjusted upwards (downwards). 12 In this particular case the fiscal stance calculated by using the cyclically adjusted deficit is confirmed by estimates based on actual discretionary measures (see Truger et al. 2010: 28-48 to the 'export-led mercantilist' regime in this country. Restricted by the European Treaties and the SGP, fiscal deficits did not compensate for private sector surpluses in the medium to long run and did thus not contribute to generating sufficient domestic demand and to avoiding current account surpluses, which were at the roots of the severity of the Great Recession at the global scale and of the following euro crisis. Also in a short-run perspective, fiscal policies being pro-cyclically restrictive in several years did not manage to stabilise the economy to a sufficient degree. Being a major cause for insufficient domestic demand, fiscal policies contributed to meagre German real GDP growth and high unemployment. This put further pressure on wages and the labour income share, which reinforced weak domestic demand growth in Germany, low unit labour cost growth and thus low inflation rates and hence contributed to the regional and global imbalances before the crisis. It is possible to criticise the stimulus packages with respect to timing, structure, and also the overall volume, but given Germany's fiscal policy history, it cannot be denied that the stimulus packages were quite a remarkable achievement in terms of stabilising the economy in a deep recession. Above all the substantial subsidies for short time work schedules in combination with flexible working time accounts proved to be very successful in preventing unemployment spikes and in helping to bridge the crisis in the labour market. Overall it seems that whereas the stimulus packages were certainly not fast enough to be responsible for the quick recovery, the labour market measures and some other measures helped to bridge the crisis, and when the recovery came due to the improved external demand many of the lagged stimulus measures helped to strengthen and sustain the upswing. 13 It is important to note in this context that the representation of the fiscal stance given by the movement of the cyclically adjusted as well as the structural budget balance in Figure 3 is incorrect in the particular circumstances of the crisis years in Germany. In Figure 3 it seems that German fiscal policy was slightly restrictive or neutral in 2009 and then switched to very strong expansion in 2010 -in clear contradiction to the numbers of the stimulus packages in Table 2 , which state that the larger part of the stimulus package had already been implemented in 2009. The most important reason for the contradiction is based in the procedure of cyclical adjustment. The procedure is based on the -empirically tested -assumption incorporated in the budget sensitivity that in a cyclical downturn revenues and unemployment benefits are affected by increases of unemployment. In a very strong crisis as the Great Recession, when the output gap fell by almost 6 percentage points from 2008 to 2009 therefore the estimated cyclical impact on the budget balance is quite high. If, however, as was the case in Germany in contrast to all previous crises, the crisis occurs without any major increase in unemployment, then the cyclical component will be overestimated leading to an underestimation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance and therefore also of the fiscal stance. Furthermore, with respect to 2010 the implied positive fiscal stance is exaggerated due to a one-off bank rescue package by 1.2 per cent of GDP. This latter effect can be taken into account in Figure 3 by looking at the graph of the structural budget balance which is the cyclically adjusted balance adjusted for one-off measures. It is perhaps not surprising that the German Debt Brake does not correspond with the functional finance view taken in Section 2 of this paper. However, it is quite remarkable that it poses problems also from a more mainstream perspective.
Firstly, the capping of structural government net borrowing at 0.35 per cent of GDP for the Bund and the banning of all structural deficits by the Länder is, economically speaking, completely arbitrary. It means that with an average annual growth in nominal GDP of 3 per cent, the national debt-to-GDP ratio will converge to just 11.7 per cent in the long run. We do not contest that there are some mainstream arguments for some ceiling on the debt ratio, but -if anything -recent empirical research indicates that the critical threshold beyond which government debt might harm growth is 80 per cent or even 90 per cent.
14 By imposing
artificial limits on what has traditionally been the safest form for financial investment, the debt brake will instead deprive capital markets of a crucial stability anchor and a vital benchmark. It is unclear in which financial assets, and to which countries, the traditionally high excess saving and the accumulated financial wealth of the German private sector (including the assets of private pension schemes) will be diverted in the future, but it is likely that this measure will contribute to more unstable financial markets.
Secondly, by using a debt brake, Germany's fiscal policy is ignoring a broadly accepted economic yardstick for the scale of national deficits -the Golden Rule -and thus turning its back on 60 years of theoretical common sense. This Golden Rule, or the 'pay-asyou-use' principle, is a growth-oriented rule for government deficits that permits structural deficits beyond the cycle equivalent to net public investment. The idea behind the rule is to involve several generations in financing public capital accumulation, since future generations will benefit in terms of greater prosperity from the productive investments made today (see
Musgrave 1959). It is true that the old rules governing borrowing by both the Bund and the
Länder in the German Constitution were imperfect: They were unable to distinguish between gross and net investment and, moreover, they failed to include all forms of economically relevant investment. However, there was no discussion around a more workable definition or an estimate of depreciation -just as there was not with the Maastricht criteria or the European Stability and Growth Pact -and the government ignored recommendations made by the Council of Economic Experts (SVR 2007), a body not exactly known for endorsing runaway sovereign debt. Moreover, the downward trend in net public investment both in absolute terms and relative to GDP would have suggested writing into the country's constitution a rule to promote public investment. Net government investment has almost continuously fallen in Germany over the last 30 years -for several years the public capital stock has, in effect, been shrinking.
Thirdly, possibly the most serious problem associated with the debt brake is that it was introduced at a time when public budgets were markedly underfinanced in structural terms, as they have come under repeated strain from tax cuts for many years. The long-term tax reductions adopted in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis and Germany's 'Growth Acceleration Act' were in the order of almost EUR 30 billion (1.2 per cent of GDP) a year (Truger and Teichmann 2011) . Where governments are expected to balance their budgets in structural terms -or to come very close to doing so -on a given date without already having closed the revenue gap, their budget policy faces years of stringent pressure on spending. In macroeconomic terms, this is an extremely risky course of action with potentially negative impacts on growth and employment as adjustments are made, particularly against the backdrop of the precarious economic situation in the Euro area as a whole. Furthermore, it will unquestionably go hand in hand with substantial cuts in the provision of public goods, services and welfare. And if this then leads (as it almost inevitably will) to the necessary public investment being scrapped or cut in future years, the much-vaunted principle of 'generational fairness' will be greatly damaged. Moreover, substantial spending cuts are difficult to justify with the argument that expenditure policy in the past has been wasteful: on the contrary, the debt brake affects German public sector budgets after a period of extremely moderate expenditure growth (Truger and Teichmann, 2011) . The decision to implement the debt brake and couple it with generous, long-term tax relief was, therefore, worse than negligent in terms both of economic impact and of national policy.
Fourthly, the debt brake will ultimately have a pro-cyclical effect because of the way the commonly used cyclical adjustment method works and will, as a result, destabilise economic development. During times of downturn, too much consolidation will be required while, conversely, too little will be required during periods of recovery (see section 4.3 below).
Fifthly, and finally, the impact of the debt brake is also, of course, critically dependent on its precise technical design and on how the underlying cyclical adjustment method and the applicable budget sensitivities are selected. Although the Bund has already opted for the method used by the European Commission as part of its own monitoring of member states' budgets, the decision as to the details of implementation is taken by the Ministries for Finance The critical points 3 and 4, the pro-cyclicality inherent in (almost) any method of cyclical adjustment of budget deficits in combination with the fixed deadlines for reaching the Constitution's target levels for structural deficits will be crucial for the future of German fiscal policy. This will be analysed further in Section 4.3 below.
As the German Debt Brake (GDB) served as a role model for the Fiscal Compact (FC)
at the European level (European Council 2012), the question arises whether there are any differences between the two. In principle, they are indeed very similar. However, there are some relevant differences: First of all, the GDB targets, in fact, go a little further than is necessary to enable Germany to meet its medium-term national budget targets under the FC.
Under the FC Germany is allowed a structural deficit equivalent to 0.5 per cent of GDP so that the GDB is slightly stricter. On the other hand, depending on the European Commission's recommendations and the Council's decision Germany might be required to reach the target values of the FC before 2020. Furthermore, the GDB applies only to the federal level and the federal states, excluding municipalities and social security budgets, whereas the FC includes both of them and sets the limits for the general government sector which may make it more ambitious. Finally, the FC sets the limits for the structural deficit regardless of how it is distributed between the different levels of government, whereas the GDB specifies the distribution between the federal level (0.35 per cent of GDP) and the federal states (0.0 per cent of GDP). What may be more relevant, however, is the fact that both the GDB and even more so the FC still lack implementation: Many federal states have not yet implemented the GDB in their own constitutions or state laws (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2011 and .
With respect to the FC it is only clear that the federal level will be held responsible for the deficits of the social security budgets and the federal states for those of their municipalities with concrete strategies still missing.
Substantial risks for the future
The national German Debt Brake together with the rules of the Fiscal Compact and the reformed Stability and Growth Pact at the European level and the way they are implemented will, to a large extent, shape the future of fiscal policy in Germany.
It is a difficult task to outline the possible consequences of these highly complex and partially interdependent institutional constraints. Government deficits and debts in the EU are currently constrained by numerous rules. In their panic to calm down financial markets and prevent risk premiums for the crisis countries' government bonds from rising indefinitely, EU member states' governments kept on tightening the institutional constraints on public deficits and debt. Those constraints were certainly never simple in the past, but after the numerous hasty amendments they have become increasingly complex so that it is quite difficult to disentangle which of the constraints will most probably become binding for the different member countries and therefore also for Germany from 2013 onwards. 15 Three sets of constraints at the European level in combination with the national debt brake seem to be most important in determining the German fiscal stance over the next 5 to 10 years.
Firstly, there is the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) with respect to budget deficits within the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is currently being applied to all Euro area members with the exception of Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg and Malta.
It requires the general government budget deficit to be reduced to below 3 per cent of GDP.
Member states under the EDP must bring their budget deficit below 3 per cent of GDP within Thirdly, the new debt related branch of the EDP calling for a 1/20 th annual reduction of the excess of the debt-GDP ratio over the 60 per cent threshold of the SGP. This rule will become effective after member states have left the EDP, because they have reached the 3 per cent target with respect to the budget deficit. The consequences of this rule are the most difficult to assess, because it requires many assumptions to be made. Given the initial debt-to-GDP ratio, in order to project the evolution of this ratio information about the evolution of the primary government balance, the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate are necessary. The evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio b can then be calculated using (5) b t = b t-1 +(r t -g t )b t-1 +(G t -T t )/P t Y t with r t being the nominal long term interest rate in year t, g t the nominal GDP growth rate, G t government primary expenditures, T t total government revenue (and accordingly G t -T t the primary government balance) and P t Y t nominal GDP.
Assuming that the German government manages to stick to the Fiscal Compact and its own debt brake this would mean that the 'structural' or average future primary surplus be somewhere around 2.5 per cent for the future. With mildly positive expectations about future nominal GDP growth after 2014 at 2.9 per cent annually and fixing the interest rate at the 2010 implicit average interest rate calculated as gross interest payments in relation to gross debt level of 3.2 per cent, then Germany would have no problem at all in reducing its debt level according to the EDP; in fact it would considerably overachieve this target (see Figure   5 ). According to a linear interpretation of the EDP prescription of debt reduction the 60 per cent threshold would have to be reached by 2033; in the scenario described this would happen as early as 2021. @3=3   @>=3   A3=3   A>=3   233>  233@  233B  2344  2345  234>  234@  234B  2324  2325  232>  232@  232B  2354  2355  235> )(.'*%(/(%*"-*8*9:*+;< 8+$C&8(*+89 +%8#+;(D&E8 ;&F&; D&E8(;/./8
Even if the assumptions made are regarded as too optimistic, the qualitative result is not very sensitive with regard to these assumptions. Taking the structural primary balance of 2.5 per cent of GDP and the interest rate as given, theoretically, Germany could 'afford' a very low annual nominal GDP growth rate of only 1.1 per cent and still manage to get its debt level below 60 per cent of GDP within 20 years and thus by 2033 (see Figure 6 ).
In what follows we focus, therefore, on the Fiscal Compact and -as it may even be slightly more demanding -on the German Debt Brake. Our focal point will be the question whether, in fact, it is plausible that the budget can be kept structurally balanced for a longer period of time. It turns out, that -although it may be possible -there are two major risks that will probably prevent the structural balance from being in accordance with the FC or the GDB for a longer time period and that in case of a deviation the necessary fiscal adjustments may very well end Germany's current seemingly comfortable position.
The first -and somewhat minor -risk stems from the fact, that the process of structural consolidation of the general government budget balance until now has relied to a substantial extent on the municipalities, and even more so, on the social security budget. order to meet the GDB targets, both the federal level and the federal states will need some slight additional consolidation. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that the structural as well as the actual surplus of the social security budget is extraordinary in historical perspective and, as a consequence of the pay-as-you-go character of the system, will have to be reduced in the near future by cutting contribution rates. This means that the consolidation efforts of the federal level may have to be increased in order to reach the FC's deficit target.
In principle this should not cause serious macroeconomic problems as the negative stimulus of further federal consolidation will be compensated by cuts in the contribution rates.
However, if the consolidation at the federal level is conducted mainly on the expenditure side, the resulting effect may be negative due to relatively higher expenditure multipliers. In principle, even this should not be worrying, because as long as the structural budget balance remains fixed, neither the GDB, nor the FC nor the EDP debt level targets should be violated.
However, it is well known, that the structural balance will not remain unaffected by the cyclical conditions of the economy as by the very nature of the method of cyclical adjustment, potential output and structural budget balances are sensitive to variations in actual output. 16 In fact it turns out that a substantial part of the structural consolidation success in the German budgets is based on 'presents' made by the endogeneity of the method. The results of the analysis of the reasons for Germany's structural consolidation improvements in recent years suggest that the future of Germany's fiscal policy will depend to a large part on its future cyclical conditions. If the German economy continues to be lucky and to see more or less satisfactory growth rates without any major slowdown then the structural consolidation improvements will continue even in the absence of major consolidation programmes. If, on the other hand, the German economy will have to suffer from a major recession or a prolonged period of stagnation then the whole process of procyclical revisions of GDP potential and with it of the structural budget balance will be reversed. It will start working in the opposite direction of a cyclical deterioration of the structural balance that would -given the fixed deadlines for the structural deficit limitsalmost inevitably lead to pro-cyclically restrictive fiscal policies just as they were observable in the period from 2001 to 2005. The resulting further deepening and prolongation of the cyclical downswing will then create a further burden for fiscal consolidation. In fact, as
shown by Truger and Will (2013) the version of the European Commission's cyclical adjustment procedure used by the German federal government is subject to endogenous revisions of potential output and therefore tends to be pro-cyclical.
It should be noted that the federal government still has some leeway for discretionary action as it is substantially overachieving with respect to the GDB's target value on the transition path due to earlier manipulation in the implementation of the debt brake (see Truger and Will 2013) . However, this leeway would not last long in the case of a downswing. 
Alternative strategies
What are the alternatives to fiscal policies following the GDB and the FC, aiming at close to zero long-run government financial balances and thus contributing to the German 'export-led mercantilist' model, to persistent imbalances at the European and the global level and to deflationary stagnation and depression in the Euro area? Of course, the first best solution would be to follow the rules and norms for member countries in a currency union, which we have outlined in Section 2 of this paper. This would mean that the medium-to long-run fiscal deficits should be roughly equal to the excess of private saving over private investment and However, such deficits would clearly violate the GDB and the regulations of the FC and would therefore require the abandonment of these regulations. This is extremely difficult to obtain, because the debt brake is in the German Constitution and a revision would require a two third majority in the German parliament. And also a revision of the Fiscal Compact, although not impossible, will be difficult to obtain, too.
Let us, therefore, discuss a second best solution, which would have to accept the limitations imposed on government deficits and debt and would accordingly have to look for other means of rebalancing the Euro area economies without crushing them. 17 Obviously, such measures would have to address the private sector financial balances and would have to adjust these balances in line with the two constraints, that is a government and an external financial balance each close to zero. In the case of Germany, this would mean stimulating private investment and raising private consumption -and hence reducing private saving. In order to include the distributional implications of such an approach, we start with equation
(1), distinguish the propensities to save from profits (s " ) and from wages (s W ), and denote the share of profits in gross national income as h and the wage share accordingly as 1-h.
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Equation (1) thus turns into:
From this equation based on an accounting identity we obtain for the implied profit share, with given propensities to save out of wages and profits:
17 Different thought experiments concerning the conditions of rebalancing according to the requirements by the SGP have been conducted e.g. by Sawyer (2011 ), Brecht et al. (2012 and Semieniuk et al. (2012a and 2012b) . 18 Different from Section 3, the wage share in this section is not corrected to include the labour income of the self-employed. It is, thus, a true wage share and not a labour income share. We have chosen this indicator for distribution, because most of the econometric studies referred to in this section have used the wage share and not the labour income share. Several recent empirical studies have examined the effects of changes in functional income distribution on aggregate demand, including or focussing on Germany (Naastepad and Storm 2007; Vogel 2008, 2009; Stockhammer et al. 2011; Onaran and Galanis 2012) . In the context of these studies the propensities to consume out of profits and out of wages were estimated starting from national account data and using gross profits (including depreciation, retained earnings, interest, dividends, rent) and wages (compensation of employees) before redistribution by the government. The results are thus appropriate for our exercise, which is also at the level of national account data and aggregates. The estimations carried out in these studies, based on annual data ranging from the early 1960s or 1970s to the early 2000s, find differentials between the propensities to save from profits and from wages within the range of 30 percentage points (Hein and Vogel 2008) and 50 percentage points (Onaran and Galanis 2012) . On average over these studies the differential is 40 percentage points. Although the estimated differentials between the two propensities are in a rather narrow band, the levels of the saving propensities are widely different. For the propensity to save from wages they vary from 9 per cent (Naastepad and Storm 2007) to 46 per cent (Hein and Vogel 2008) and for the propensity to save from profits we have values ranging from 48 per cent (Naastepad and Storm 2007) to 82 per cent (Onaran and Galanis 2012). 19 In order to base our scenarios on consistent data we have, therefore, chosen to calibrate the propensity to save from wages, using the robust differential of the saving propensities from profits and from wages of 40 percentage points obtained from the econometric studies, together with average data for Germany for the euro period before the crisis, i.e. for the period 1999-2007, taken from the national accounts. Rearranging equation (7), we have calculated the propensity to save from wages as follows:
We obtain from this that the propensity to save consistent with the data for the considered period and with the differential in saving propensities from previous econometric studies is very low and only about 5 per cent.
Using equation (7), we have generated five potential scenarios in Table 3 , taking into account the requirement of balanced or close to balance government budgets, on the one hand, and the requirement of a balanced or only slightly in surplus current account for Germany, on the other hand. For these scenarios we have applied the propensity to save out of wages, In Scenario C we also relax the requirement of a balanced current account and allow for a current account surplus of two per cent of GDP. In and Hein (2013) we have argued that in a heterogeneous currency union with catching-up processes of less developed members we would not expect current accounts to be exactly balanced. Rather current account surpluses in the mature economies with slower growth and current account deficits in the catching-up countries with higher growth should emerge and should be tolerated. However, to make these processes sustainable, stable financial transfers from surplus to deficit countries would have to be organised. But even if we allow for moderate current account surpluses in Germany, we would still need considerable redistribution, i.e. a reduction of the profit share by seven percentage points and an increase of the wage share to the level of the early 1990s. And in Scenario E a decrease in the propensity to save from wages (and with stable differentials also in the propensity to save from profits) by 2 percentage points provides the required domestic demand compensating for the loss of government and foreign demand. But again it is difficult to see, how such a decline in the propensities to save could be obtained,
given the notorious absence of wealth effects in private consumption in Germany and the tendency of precautionary saving to rise in periods of increasing uncertainty, as has already been observed before the recent crisis (Dreger and Slacalek 2007; Klär and Slacalek 2006;  van Treeck and Sturn 2012).
These simple calculations based on national accounting identities including some empirical estimation results on the differentials between the propensities to save from profits and wages were meant to show how difficult a second best solution, respecting the debt brake and the Fiscal Compact and aiming at preventing 'beggar thy neighbour' policies will be to achieve in the case of Germany with its notorious private sector financial surpluses.
Restricting the government to absorb these surpluses puts enormous pressure on the rest of the world to accept German current account surpluses and the associated deficit position. If this is to be avoided either unrealistically optimistic assumptions about future private investment or about behavioural changes with respect to consumption and saving have to be made.
Alternatively major redistributions in favour of the wage share lifting it to levels not seen so far in modern German history would be required. Of course, instead of focussing exclusively on the functional distribution of market incomes, government redistribution by means of progressive income and wealth taxes and social transfers should be applied, too, as supplementary instruments. But the redistribution requirements are immense and will be politically hardly achievable.
Summary and conclusions
Currently (2013), fiscal policies in Germany seem to be in a very comfortable position and the German Debt Brake is regarded as an institutional precondition for this and has been exported to the Euro area in the guise of the Fiscal Compact. In this paper we have scrutinized German fiscal policies and its new institutional foundations from a macroeconomic perspective. In Section 2 we have started by reiterating the requirements for fiscal policies of member countries in a currency union like the Euro area with centralised monetary policies but decentralised fiscal policies from a Post-Keynesian perspective. From this perspective, fiscal deficits should be guided by macroeconomic requirements, which may be different in different member countries, and target fiscal deficits (surpluses) in the range of the excess of private saving over private investment at full employment levels of economic activities in each of the member countries. In Section 3 we have examined German fiscal policies in the period from 1999 until 2007, that is from the introduction of the euro until the Great Recession. We have shown that fiscal policies have clearly violated the norm outlined in Section 2 and have contributed considerably to the German 'export-led mercantilist' type of economic development, which is one of the causes of the current account imbalances within the Euro area and one important root to the euro crisis. In Section 4 we have then turned to German fiscal policies during the crisis, the debt brake and future perspectives. We have sketched the unexpected counter-cyclical fiscal policy reactions towards the Great Recession and have then analysed the German Debt Brake in more detail, in association with the Fiscal
Compact and the debt reduction rule of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. We have discussed the associated risks and potential future developments and have argued that seemingly successful German fiscal consolidation complying with the requirements of these new institutional regulations so far was fostered by favourable external circumstances and built in facilitations. Even with continuous moderate nominal GDP growth also in the future, Germany will be able to comply with these rules without further fiscal tightening. However, this will not be true in the case of deep recessions or prolonged periods of stagnation. But even if no further discretionary fiscal tightening will be required in the future, sticking to the German Debt Brake, the Fiscal Compact and the debt reduction rule of the Excessive Deficit Procedure will mean that German fiscal policies might continue to violate the macroeconomic requirements for fiscal policies in currency union outlined in Section 2, if there is no adjustment of the private sector financial balance. Therefore, in Section 5 we have taken the requirements of the Fiscal Compact as given and have discussed alternative scenarios, which would avoid the deflationary pressures of the debt brake on German domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area. We have argued that either a tremendous re-distribution of income in favour of labour, not seen in German history, or a drastic increase in private investment, not seen since German re-unification, or a considerable decline in the average propensity to save against the long-run trend, even before the crisis, would be required. Therefore, none of these alternatives seem to be realistic options. Germany will, thus, continue to free-ride on external demand and German fiscal policies will contribute to deflationary pressure and imbalances at the European and the global level.
